Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

If identity is to be taken as a relation, not between any object and itself, nor between expressions , but between "intensions" or Fregean "Sinnen" of individual constants , then not only definite descriptions but also grammatically proper names ought to have intensions. This, however, has been repudiated by J. St. Mill and, more recently and more persuasively, by Saul Kripke. So an attempt will be made to interpret proper names as definite descriptions sui generis, namely, "rigid" descriptions referring to (...) the way the bearer of the name is called, in certain contexts, in the real world. To avoid circularity or a vicious regressus in infinitum, however, one has to do this on the basis of a distinction between "names" and "name-radicals". (shrink)

The symbolic paraphrase of 'because' sentences suggested by Frege, which is still widely accepted, will be gradually developed into a more adequate, though much more complicated, form. Out of the different types of such sentences, the 'for the only reason that' type will be given especial consideration. Furthermore, it will be expounded that contrary-to-fact conditionals may function either as 'for the only reason that' explanations, or as 'for at least the reason that' explanations, or as arguments, the difference being dependent (...) partly on certain temporal characteristics of their constituents and partly on the pragmatic features of the speech act situation. Consequently, counterfactuals have no definite logical structure, which is a reason, hitherto unnoticed, why they cannot be used in defining dispositional predicates. It will be shown, however, that 'for the only reason that' explanations can serve this purpose quite properly. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Having stated, in section I., what the reader may expect from this paper, I will sum up, in section II., my views on the question how to justify a moral ‚ought‘-statement (a statement of moral obligation), notably a statement of the first-person form ‚I morally ought not to act in such and such a way if and when (I believe that) I am in such und such a situation.‘ In my view, its justification should consist of two quite different parts. (...) The first part is a logical proof based on my own personal language usage (‚idiolect‘) – namely, the proof that a time-honoured and highly efficient moral principle that I suggest to call the Universalized Golden Rule (UGR) is, in my idiolect (which I think to be shared by many other speakers of any sufficiently developed natural language), a locically true conditional statement (II. 1. – 5.). This part belongs, of course, to the jobs of the philosophical ethicist (metaethicist), who has to cope with it once for all. The second part, however, is a daily task of each of us and seems to me, pace R. M. Hare, to be a kind of ‚verification‘; I use to call it a ‚Nathan-David‘ procedure and will expound it in detail (II. 6. – 9.). In section III., I will try to offer an array of more or less elaborated Nathan-David procedures to the effect that he who shares my personal idiolect, my basic preferences, and my factual knowledge cannot but consider himself morally obligated to ask for his Covid-19 vaccinations as soon as possible. In section IV., I will argue in favour of the view that the German State is not only entitled but, if need be, legally obligated to make the Covid-19 vaccination compulsary. In the final section V., I will try and give a relentless assessment of the situation, a short outlook into the future, and a succinct analysis of how to most efficiently handle the pandemic under the factual boundary conditions given. (shrink)

The authors believe that the questions raised at the beginning of Frege’s On Sense and Reference – ‘Is [identity] a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?’ – set the course for a long-lasting but not at all satisfying discussion. For the disputants tend to advocate, either a ‘name-view’ of identity in a straightforward but rudimentary and logically untenable form, or else a version of an ‘object-view’ that makes all too light of the analysandum–analysans distinction (...) and hence is damned to analytical barrenness. In contrast, by unfolding the underlying idea of the original ‘name-view’, the authors offer three alternative and mutually compatible interpretations of identity that may best be characterized as the ‘name-based’, the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘sense-based’ variant of a ‘concept-view of identity’. At the same time, however, these interpretations may well be considered variants of a non-barren ‘object-view’. (shrink)

Adopting an ontology of full concreteness , one has to distinguish between human action in the internal view of the actor himself and human action in the external view of a fellow human being, or spectator. As seen from the latter point of view, human action is nothing but observable behavior. As such, it belongs in the objective realm of natural necessity, as does any other macrophysical event . As seen from the former point of view, human action may be (...) characterized as a system of non-indicative subjective traits of the actor's intentional objects, appealing to him, in the light of his motives, in a 'gerundive' way. As such, it does not belong in the objective realm of natural necessity, and is free, moreover, in the positive sense that the actor could have acted otherwise. If these perspectives are commingled - as there is a strong tendency to do by arguing, or construing, from analogy -, the result is confusion. But if they are seen as disjunct alternatives, the result is complementarity in the sense of Bohr. However, we must not misconstrue such complementarity as a dual-aspect-conception, for there seems to be no good sense in saying that action as a system of non-indicative subjective traits and action as objective behavior are but two aspects of one and the same human action 'in itself', i.e., irrespective of the modes of subjective givenness. Auf dem Boden einer Ontologie der vollen Konkretion muß man zwischen dem menschlichen Handeln in der Innensicht des Handelnden selbst und dem menschlichen Handeln in der Außensicht eines Mitmenschen unterscheiden. Vom Standpunkt eines mitmenschlichen Zuschauers aus ist menschliches Handeln nichts anderes als beobachtbares Verhalten; als solches gehört es, genau wie jedes andere makrophysikalische Ereignis, ungeachtet mikrophysikalischer Indeterminismen in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit. Vom Standpunkt des Handelnden selbst aus läßt sich menschliches Handeln dagegen als ein System motivbedingter 'gerundiver' Charaktere der subjektiven Bezugsgegenstände des jeweils Handelnden kennzeichnen; als solches gehört es nicht in den objektiven Bereich der Naturnotwendigkeit und ist überdies auch in dem positiven Sinne frei, daß der Handelnde auch anders hätte handeln können. Wenn man beide Perspektiven vermengt - und es gibt eine starke Tendenz, dies aufgrund von Analogieschlüssen oder analogisierenden Auffassungen zu tun -, entsteht Konfusion; aber wenn man die beiden Perspektiven als disjunkte Alternativen sieht, ergibt sich Komplementarität im Sinne Bohrs. Wir dürfen solche Komplementarität freilich nicht als eine Zwei-Aspekte-Konzeption mißdeuten; denn man scheint nicht wirklich sinnvoll sagen zu können, Handeln als ein System von gerundiven subjektiven Charakteren und Handeln als objektives Verhalten seien nur zwei Aspekte einer und derselben menschlichen Handlung 'an sich', nämlich ohne Rücksicht auf ihre subjektiven Gegebenheitsweisen. (shrink)

Hare believeded to have good reasons for stressing tho role of falsification in justifying a moral judgment. Taking this seriously, we cannot accept the objection that he should have tailored his creditor example in terns of pemission rather than in terms of prescription. Difficulties, howerer, are due to the fact that, according to Hare, respectively my volitional reaction to a fictional situation is part and parcel of moral reasoning; for this kind of evidence turns out to he no less 'verifying' (...) than 'falsifying'. So it seems that the distinction between verificationism and falsificationism, though useful in metascience, cannot properly be transferred to metaethics. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...) and rationalist accounts self-awareness fail to provide models that adequately explain how such a shift from an active emotional response to an increased cognitive/volitional orientation is possible. Instead, notions of self-awareness, as understood by founding phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, fit the testimony of SSRI subjects. (shrink)

Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess the pros (...) and cons of Frege’s view that the indirect reference of an expression is nothing but its customary sense (Sections 3–4), and call the reader’s attention to the fact that in belief ascriptions de re we take it for granted that the believer’s intentional object is at the same time a ‘citizen’ of the belief ascriber’s subjective world (or, for that matter, the real word), and that the idea of such a ‘dual citizenship’ is even more obviously presupposed in the cases of true belief and propositional knowledge (Section 5). Then, we try to argue that it is more fertile to take the belief ascriber’s intentional object to be, not the whole state of affairs the believer has in mind and thinks to exist, but the latter’s intentional object as such, that is, as being his intentional object (Section 6). Finally, we discuss the intricate and mostly neglected question of whether an intentional object’s inhabiting two or more subjective belief-worlds should be considered to be sort of a ‘transmundane identity’ in the numerical sense or rather in some deviant sense of the term, which can be specified as a momentous subcase of a ‘categorial difference’ (Section 7). (shrink)

Versuche zur Geschlechtswahl bei der Befruchtung führten in jüngerer Zeit zu anwendbaren, wenngleich noch eingeschränkt erfolgssicheren Techniken. Deren ethische und rechtliche Bewertungen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Abhandlung. In Gesellschaften und Kulturen mit traditioneller Bevorzugung männlicher Nachkommenschaft gibt es einerseits ein starkes Interesse für die Geschlechtswahl, andererseits wird in einigen westlichen Ländern der vorgeburtlichen Geschlechtswahl sehr geringe praktische Bedeutung beigemessen. Dabei unterscheidet sich die Verfügbarkeit der entsprechenden reproduktionsmedizinischen Verfahren von freier Zugänglichkeit zu allen Methoden (Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Spermatozoentrennung usw.) des Fortpflanzungsmedizinmarkts (USA) bis (...) hin zu strenger Reglementierung (Deutschland). Es wird anhand der wissenschaftlichen Literatur der Frage nachgegangen, welche für die Begründung rechtlicher Regelung beachtlichen sozialen oder gesundheitlichen Gefährdungen durch präkonzeptionelle Geschlechtswahl verursacht werden könnten, und welche Gründe es andererseits für die Zulässigkeit sozial motivierter präkonzeptioneller Geschlechtswahl gibt. (shrink)

O impulso filosófico fundamental de Dilthey é uma fundamentação filosófica das ciências humanas. Ele segue esse projeto de uma “Crítica da Razão Histórica”, como ele chegou a chamar seu plano, desde a metade dos anos 60 do século XIX até o final de sua vida em 1911. Essa intenção de uma fundamentação das ciências do homem, da sociedade e da história remete à confrontação da Escola Histórica, cujos representantes principais Dilthey conheceu durante sua época de estudante em Berlim, com o (...) positivismo franco-inglês, ou seja, o empirismo de Comte, Mill e Buckle. O presente texto procura apresentar e comentar detalhadamente esse projeto, que encontrou sua forma mais madura na obra tardia A Construção do Mundo Histórico nas Ciências Humanas (1911). (shrink)

O Artigo Episcopado Brasileiro em São Paulo – Unidade da Igreja no Brasil marca o itinerário da Igreja no Brasil no final do Século XIX. Como situar a sociedade brasileira no Século XIX? Como a Igreja reagiu ao Estado Republicano? Qual foi o papel do Romano Pontífice na Igreja no Brasil? A Reunião dos Bispos em São Paulo em 1890 sela a Unidade do Episcopado. O tema é oportuno quando pontuamos os 60 anos da CNBB (1952-2012) e os 50 anos (...) da Abertura do Concílio Ecumênico Vaticano II (1962-2012). A Igreja é que Una tanto mais será luz para a sociedade se se apresentar Unida. (shrink)

"›Operative Ontologien‹ erscheinen als eine sehr plausible Gegenwartsreaktion auf die Geschichte der westlichen Erkenntnistheorien seit der frühen Moderne. Sie basiert auf der meta-theoretischen Prämisse, dass derartig grundlegende Theorien sich heute nicht mehr als zwingend ›notwendig‹ erweisen, sondern zu einem Gegenstand der Wahl geworden sind. Eine Reihe von überzeugenden existentiellen, intellektuellen und ästhetischen Gründen spricht für die Wahl der ›operativen Ontologien‹ des IKKM. ‘Operative Ontologies’ appear as a highly plausible present-day reaction to the history of Western epistemologies since Early Modernity, based (...) on the meta-theoretical premise that such frameworks, instead of imposing themselves as ‘necessary,’ have become an object of choice today. In this spirit, the IKKM’s choice of ‘operative ontologies’ has a number of compelling existential, intellectual, and aesthetic reasons speaking for itself.". (shrink)

The end of Conciliarism was the Pope's return to Rome and the strengthening of the papacy in the West. The decline of the Roman Empire in the East with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 puts an end to the Medieval period and the emergence of the modern period of history and also of the Church. In the modern period of history began the European overseas expansionism and disintegrate the Church in Europe. The advent of the French revolution in 1789 (...) scored the beginning of Contemporary and Period marked definitely the Church as a prophetic sign living and proclaiming the joys and hopes in Christ Jesus to people with greater intensity. (shrink)

O texto procura refletir, de maneira prospectiva, sobre a contribuição que a Conferência de Aparecida poderá dar à igreja universal, e em especial para o continente latino-americano. Diagnostica linhas de continuidade com a prática atual da igreja e enumera esperanças das comunidades eclesiais com relação à V Conferência.

O artigo apresenta uma analise a partir da renovação eclesiológica do Vaticano II, em seguida apresenta a pneumatologia como origem desta renovação. A comunhão na Igreja só será possível através do Espírito Santo.

No último século, os exegetas cristãos, para obter uma compreensão mais profunda dos escritos neotestamentários, despertaram progressivamente para a necessidade de conhecer as fontes, práticas e características da exegese judaica (do período do Segundo Templo e do período Rabínico). Esta mudança de perspectiva fez com que a exegese cristã entrasse em diálogo com o derás, a hermenêutica própria do judaísmo. Neste artigo apresentamos a complexa questão da definição e da distinção dos dois termos: derás e midrás. Seguimos o caminho histórico (...) percorrido pelos exegetas cristãos quanto à compreensão e à aplicação dos dois termos. Enfocamos, de modo particular, o debate sobre a compreensão do midrás/derás enquanto gênero literário específico (Wright) ou método exegético e hermenêutico (Bloch; Díez Macho; Le Déaut; etc). (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a situação de diversidade de religiões em que o mundo se encontra hoje, e o caminho que a Igreja encontrou para o diálogo, a partir do impulso dado pelo Vaticano II, e agora assumido também pela V Conferência Geral do Episcopado Latino-Americano e do Caribe, realizada em Aparecida.

RESUMO Os homens, por natureza, desejam conhecer. Sinal disso é o prazer que nos proporcionam os nossos sentidos, pois ainda que não levemos em conta suas utilidades são estimados por si mesmos, destacando-se acima de todos os outros o sentido da visão. Segundo Platão, esta preocupação filosófica sempre foi a razão de ser da filosofia porque o filosofo, amante do conhecimento, busca sempre a verdade. Ele ama o saber. A busca do saber interior exige do filósofo não qualquer conhecimento, mas (...) somente aquele que ele considera como verdadeiro. Invocando as ideias acima externadas, este artigo traduz o expresso objetivo de iluminar os caminhos do leitor na busca desse conhecimento. (shrink)

Frente uma situação sócio-cultural, eclesial e societária onde vive-se a falta de liberdade criativa e de uma ação ousada, alternativa e esperançosa, Paulo parece apontar caminho, à luz do Evangelho da liberdade, para uma experiência nova e prometedora. O que importa é assumir com responsabilidade a Vida e superar toda "escravidão", vale dizer, o que vale é viver em liberdade na experiência do amor diante do império da impotência e da morte. A experiência da fé tem que levar ao agir (...) ético que revele uma vida livre e construtora de uma nova realidade de vida, relacionamento e compromisso no atual contexto. (shrink)